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Abstract: The General Rufes of Civil Law (GRCL) will have a substantial 
injluence on the development ofCivil Law in the Peoples Republic ofChina 
in the coming years. Similarly, the generallegal principles embedded in the 
GRCL will help to shape and concretize this redefined legal code. lt is in 
this way that fundamental principles such as the freedom of contract and 
the absolute protection of particular legal interests have finally been incor-
porated into the legal framework in China. The consideration and imple-
mentation of such principles belang to a category of particularly challeng-
ing aspects of juridical work. Such fundamental principles are often not 
codified and must therefore first be deducted via the interpretation of more 
complex legal ideas. Once this has been done, it is up to the lawyers under 
the consideration ofthe Iex superior doctrine to further outline and concre-
tise these principles in order to avoid and resolve possible collisions. The 
following article shows by means of numerous examples how in its early 
stage, Chinese Civil Law can be inspired by and learn from German legal 
dogma. At the same time, the following article comprises a detailed com-
parison ofthefundamental principlesfound in the GRCL and the German 
Civil Code (BGB). 
Keywords: Working with principles; legal principles; freedom to contract; 
legal idea; legal rule; legal doctrine; priority of norms; private autonomy; 
pacta sunt servanda; primacy of law . 
• Dr. iur. habil.; Professor, University of Augsburg, Faculty of Law. Managing 
Director of the Center for European Legal Studies, Chair for Civil Law, Eco-
nomic Law, European Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law. 
The Contribution was presented du ring the conference of the research institute 
RICE, also at the China University of Political Science and Law, the Gansu Col-
lege, and the Lanzhou University. I would like to thank the participants for the 
stimulating discussions during these events. 
55 
Thomas M.J. Möllers 
l. On the legal relevance of legal principles 57 
1. Excerpt oflegal principles in the GRCL: voluntariness 
and freedom to contract, equality and protection of 
physical integrity and property 59 
2. Terms and Distinctions 59 
a) Legal Principle (Rechtsprinzip) 59 
b) Legal Concepts (Rechtsidee) 60 
c) Legal Doctrine (Rechtsinstitute) 61 
3. Legal Obligation and the Prevention ofEmpty Phrases 61 
a) Obligation to Induct and Substantiate 61 
b) Preventing empty phrases 62 
I I. Derivation and substantiation of legal principles through the 
priority ofnorms (Iex specialis) 62 
I. Lex specialis - the more specific norm precedes, section 11 
GRCL 62 
2. Selected examples 63 
a) The principle ofvoluntariness and substantiation 
through specific provisions 63 
b) The protection of physical and proprietary rights and 
sections 107 et seqq. and sections 176 et seqq. GRCL 64 
Ill. Substantiation through deduction oflegal principles and the 
creation of new legal concepts 66 
1. Induction and Deduction 66 
2. Freedom to contract and binding effect of a contract 67 
a) Freedom to contract according to sections 5, 7 GRCL 67 
b) Freedom of contract as a consequence of freedom of 
the will under German Law 67 
c) The justification of a binding contract (pacta sunt 
servanda) 69 
3. Private autonomy as self-determination for both parties 70 
a) Self-determination ofthe individualsandmutual self-
determination 70 
b) Derivation of the principle of self-determination from 
the BGB and the constitution 71 
56 
Principles in the Chinese Civil Code 
4. Deduction: The doctrinallegal justification ofthe various 
legal doctrines where the right of self-deterrnination is 
~~ n 
a) Obligation to contract and Iack of self-deterrnination n 
b) Price controls under section 138 para. 1 BGB for 
contracts which intervene in the self-determined life 
witb severe freedom-restricting consequences 73 
c) A freedom-restricting Iack of equivalence as frustration 
ofthe contract 75 
IV. Lex superior- Primacy ofLaw 76 
1. The legal situation in Germany 76 
a) The principle Iex superior 76 
b) Higher rank ofrules on competences 77 
c) Primacy ofthe Constitution 78 
2. The Primacy of Law in Chinese Law 78 
a) The Prirnacy of Law according to Art. 95 Legislation 
Law 78 
b) Chinese Law and the Constitution, section 1 GRCL 79 
V. Resolution of conflicts between principles through balancing-
working with basic laws 80 
1. No general principle ofproportionality in the German BGB 80 
a) Affirmation of a principle of proportionality in Civil 
Law 80 
b) Rejection ofthe principle ofproportionality in Civil 
Law 81 
c) Own opinion 82 
2. Principle ofproportionality in Chinese Civil Law? 85 
VI. Summary 85 
I On the legal relevance of legal principles 
A lawyer does not only need to know and apply the law. A good lawyer 
knows the interplay between law, jurisdiction, and legal literature. Legal 
dogmatics is a combination of numerous written and unwritten rules which 
make the law understandable in the first place but which are indispensable 
for the profound understanding of the law. What are legal principles, 
though? How are the legal principles applied? The recently passed General 
Principles ofCivil Law (GRCL) contain a shell thereof. 
In the following, the legal principle will first be depicted and distin-
guished from the legal idea and the legal doctrine (I.). Then, four techniques 
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to substantiate legal principles will be presented. The first one entails a ref-
erence to other more specific norms (11.). A second technique is the sub-
stantiation through induction and deduction (III.). Then, the methodology 
of the higher-ranking law will be described (IV.). Eventually, principles 
couJd be substantiated through balancing (V.). 
In our society, having principles is usually a positive character trait for a 
person to have. lf a person remains true to their principles, they are consid-
ered tobe strong-willed, sincere, and straightforward. In this respect, poli-
ticians and representatives in election campaigns are very often prematurely 
assumed to put honest convictions aside in favour of securing power and 
influence; or acting opportunistically in the interests of the strongest Iobby 
at the time, and against the interests of the sovereign people. According to 
Gandhi "politics without principles" even represents one of his famous 
seven deadly sins of modern society. 1 lt is therefore hardly a new insight 
that both our man-made Basic Law (GG) and the ordinary law are perme-
ated with numerous principles which are meant to ensure that the Jaw is as 
Straightforward as possible. However, it is all the more astonishing that only 
a few ofthese legal principles aresetout in positive law. So, for example, 
there is as little explicitly recorded in writing on the principle in the law of 
Obligations of freedom of contract2 in the German Civil Code (BGB) as 
there is on the principle of contractual fidel ity (pacta sunt servanda)3• How-
ever, no one seriously disputes the existence and applicability ofthese prin-
ciples. Other states, however, have codified numerous principles.4 
Mahatma Gandhi, Seven Social Sins, 43 Young India October 22, 361 (1925): 
"politics without principles". 
2 The term is even referred to in the Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuches filr das Deutsche Reich (Statements on the Draft of a Civil Code 
fortheGerman Reich), vol. 2, 2 (1896): "By virtue ofthe principle offreedom 
of contract, which governs the law of contractual Obligations, the parties can 
determine their legal relationships and associations between themselves at their 
discretion with binding effect, insofar as there are no conflicting generat or spe-
cific individual absolute legal provisions". 
3 In contrast, the principle was even found in the original Article 77 of the 
Entwürfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches tllr das Deutsche Reich (Draft of a 
Civil Code fortheGerman Reich) (1888): "In order to conclude a contract, it is 
necessary for the contracting parties to declare their corresponding intentions to 
each other"; This Article 77 was then deleted by the second commission, see 
Commission's Report, 156, Benno Mugdan, Die gesamten Materialien des Bür-
gerlichen Gesetzbuchs tllr das Deutsche Reich, vol. I, 688 (1899). 
4 On pacta sunt servanda see for example fn. 28; on immorality see fn. 47. 
58 
Principles in the Chinese Civil Code 
1. Excerpt of legal principles in the GRCL: voluntariness and freedom to 
contract, equality and protection of physical integrity and property 
Three principles of the GRCL have been chosen to provide an example of 
how to work out a structure with principles: ln section 5 GRCL, the princi-
ple ofthe freedom to contract is phrasedas the "principle ofvoluntariness". 
Hereto Professor Wei Shen stated in his contribution to the conference: "As 
the principle of voluntariness is rooted in the Western enlightenment con-
ception of the individual, it is ironic that Chinese law should embrace a 
break with values rooted in Chinese family and collective traditions and it 
is similarly a milestone in the break with socialist values restricting freedom 
of economic action." 
ln Chinese law, one principle that is particularly stressed is the equality 
ofthe parties. lt can be found in section 2 as weil as in section 4 GRCL. In 
German law, equality is located in Art. 3 GG and as such is primarily a basic 
law and a right of defence against the state. Section 5 of the GPCL of 1986 
still stated that "civil rights and interests of the citizens and legal entities" 
must be protected. The present section 3 GRCL phrases with more intensity 
that physical rights and property rights [ ... ] may not be infringed by indi-
viduals or Organisations. 
2. Terms and Distinctions 
a) Legal Principle (Rechtsprinzip) 
A defmition of a legal principle must contain three components: Legal prin-
ciples or (often used synonymously) principles of law are initially only 
partly standardised, and often notsetout in law at all. They are extracted 
from the legal system as the totality ofthe written and unwritten legal norms 
and are more than legal concepts. They allow a certain generalisation.5 Prin-
ciples form "the deep structure ofthe law".6 
5 Jürgen Basedow, 200 AcP 446, 453 (2000). In detail, also Claus-Wilhelm Cana-
ris, Die Feststellung von Lücken im Gesetz, 4 7 et seq (2nd ed. 1983). 
6 Klaus Friedrich Röhl and Hans Christian Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 283 
(3'd ed. 2008). 
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They generally claim normative validity and Iead to a presumption of con-
formity.7 However, principles are frequently not classifiable and require 
further specification through legal rules or balancing. Or in the words of 
Bydlinski: "They are thus guiding principles and grounds ofjustification of 
a legal provision, but not the positive provision itself."8 The Basic Law al-
ready contains those which are probably the best known: Fundamental 
rights are principles par excellence. Tbe mere fact that legal principles dom-
inate our highest-ranking codifications shows their enormous importance in 
reaching legally sound decisions, and thus forces legal scholars to discuss 
them. 
b) Legal Concepts (Rechtsidee) 
Legal concepts have a higher status than legal principles. They provide rea-
sons for norms which formulate the requirements or prohibitions.9 Such le-
gal concepts, which are to some extent also referred to as values10, are ofa 
higher Ievel of abstraction and frequently too general for them to be used to 
resolve a case. Legal concepts such as justice, expediency and legal cer-
tainty must therefore also be further specified to make it possible to have 
transparent, persuasive trains of thought and justification. Otberwise there 
is a risk that the concept is only used as an empty phrase. 11 
7 Klaus Friedrich Röhl and Hans Christian Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 284 
(3'd ed. 2008). 
8 Franz Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, 132 (2"d ed. 
1991). 
9 Matthias Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie, section 24, § 13 
(3rd ed. 20 15). 
10 Wolfgang Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts, vol. 4, 394 et seq. (1977). 
II This particularly applies for the concept ofthe "nature ofthe matter" . See Hein-
rich Demburg, Pandekten, vol. I, 84 (7. ed. 1902); Heinrich Demburg, System 
des römischen Rechts, vol. 1, section 32.2, 64 (8th ed. 1911); Andreas von Thur, 
Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerliches Rechts, vol. I , 42 ( 19 10); Arthur Kaufmann, 
Analogie und "Natur der Sache" (2"d ed. 1982); Friedrich Müller, Normstruktur 
und Normativität, 94 et seq. ( 1966); Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswis-
senschaft, 417 et seqq. (61h ed. 1991) with further citations; Claus-Wilhelm 
Canaris, Die Feststellung von Lücken im Gesetz, 100 (2nd ed. 1983). 
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c) Legal Doctrine (Rechtsinstitute) 
Legal principles require further specification to be applicable for the spe-
cific case. A legal rule can exist in a legal doctrine developed by jurispru-
dence, such as the obligation to contract. A legal doctrine, in its application, 
is then eventually a rule in the sense of Alexy or a positive rule in the sense 
of Bydlinski.12 ln the interim, it is substantiated and, through the develop-
ment of tangible, directly classifiable features, has also acquired a binding 
character13 and apparent authority.14 
3. Legal Obligation and the Prevention ofEmpty Phrases 
a) Obligation to lnduct and Substantiate 
Some claim that legal principles are mere declarations of intent without le-
gal relevance15• In the following, the opposite view is held. Legal principles, 
such as pacta sunt servanda, are legally significant. This is in accordance 
with the law in Germany. It is generally assumed that the BGB presupposes 
these principles as sirnply being obviously valid.16 However, they need to 
be legally defmed. Then, it needs to be outlined how they are applied. They 
need to be deducted in a frrst step and then substantiated in a second step. 
12 See also Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, § I I recital 12 et 
seqq. (2017). 
13 Thus, for example, liability for apparent rights is established as a legal principle 
from sections 171 , 172 BGB and section 405 BGB. This principle is then devel-
oped into the legal doctrine of agency by estoppel, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Supreme Court], October 15, 1987, Ill ZR 235/86, BGHZ 102, 60, 64; 
then without the doctrinal derivation: BGH, May 11 , 2011 , Vlll ZR 289/09, 
BGHZ 189,346 § 15 - use ofa third-party eBay member's account 
14 BGH, January 20, 1983, VII ZR 32/82, BGHZ 86, 273, 274 et seq.- apparent 
authority. 
15 William C Jones, 28 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 309 (1987). 
16 Thus Werner Flurne, DJT 135, 136 et seq. (1960); Werner Flume, Allgemeiner 
Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, Das Rechtsgeschäft, vol. 2, section l.l , I ( 1965); 
agreeing Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, 200 AcP 273, 277 (2000); Reinhard Bork, All-
gemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, recital 99 (4th ed. 2016). 
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b) Preventing empty phrases 
Section 6 GRCL uses the principle of "fairness" to determine rights and 
Obligations of the parties. Section 7 GRCL mentions the principle of good 
faith. It was originally codified in section 4 GPCL and followed the German 
"good faith" of section 242 BGB. In Chinese law applying the principle of 
good faith is treated with respect because its vagueness is criticised. Forthis 
reason, it is not sufficient to use empty phrases. In the German law legal 
principles are in part derived from the "nature of the matter" (Natur der 
Sache). This was first introduced by Dernburg11 and later accepted by the 
literature18 and jurisdiction19• This is rejected because the term "nature of 
the matter" does not establish anything by itself.20 Also legal ethical princi-
ples as for example "justice" and "faimess" need tobe further substantiated 
to make comprehensible, persuasive thoughts and justifications possible. 
/I Derivation and substantiation of legal principles through the priority of 
norms (Iex specialis) 
1. Lex specialis- the more specific norm precedes, section 11 GRCL 
Section 11 GRCL determines that specific provisions precede.21 The Ger-
man law is also very aware ofthis principle. The rule Iex specialis derogat 
17 Heinrich Demburg, Pandekten, vol. 1, 87 (4th ed. 1894); Heinrich Demburg, 
System des römischen Rechts, vol. 1, 64 (8th ed. 1911 ); Andreas von Thur, All-
gemeiner Teil des Bürgerliches Rechts, vol. I, 42 (1910). 
18 In detail Kar! Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 417 et seqq. 
W" ed. 1991); Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die Feststellung von Lücken im Gesetz 
100(2nded.l983). 
19 BVerfG, February20, 1952(Az. I BvF2/5l),BVerfGE I, 117, 131. 
20 Critical: Horst Dreier, Zum Begriff der "Natur der Sache", 127 et seq. (1965); 
Klaus Friedrich Röhl and Hans Christian Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 74 
(3nl ed. 2008): "It turnsout that the issue ofthe essence as weil as the nature of 
the matter does not add any argument at any point"; Peter Raisch, Juristische 
Methoden, 178 (1995); Bemd Rüthers, Christian Fischer and Axel Birk, 
Rechtstheorie, recital 929 (9th ed. 20 16). 
21 See also Yuanshi Bu, ZChinR 183, 186 et seq. (2017). 
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legi generali is based on Roman law22 and means that a specific law pre-
cedes the generallaw. The same rule can be found in Anglo American law: 
Generalia specialibus non derogant: A general rule cannot supersede a 
more specific rule.23 The principle of Iex specialis must be affirmed if a 
claim depends on requirements that are more restrictive and unfavourable.24 
2. Selected examples 
a) The principle ofvoluntariness and substantiation through specific provi-
sions 
The principle of voluntariness is derived from section 5 GRCL. It is sub-
stantiated in Chinese law. The principle of good faith according to section 7 
GRCL is substantiated by section 119 GRCL insofar that a contract is Ie-
gally binding and thus must be adhered to. ln European law the principle of 
"pacta sunt servanda" is well-known. The counterpart to freedom of con-
tract is the binding contract or contractual fidelity (pacta sunt servanda). 
The principle of a binding contract is not of Roman origin,25 but was rather 
first developed for all types of contract by canon law, the late scholasticism, 
22 For the original in Greek, see Mod. D. 1,4,4 as weil as Pap. D. 48,19,4 1: nec 
arnbigitur in cetero omni iure speciem generi derogare; seealso Sebastiano Med-
ici, De legibus, statutis, et consuetudine, 92 (Sebastiano Medici et al. eds., 1574): 
Lex specialis derogat generali. 
23 Or literally: General provisions do not precede specific provisions; Oliver Jones 
and Francis Alan Roscoe Bennion, Sennion on Statutory Interpretation 281 
(6'h ed. 2013). 
24 Ernst A. Krarner, Juristische Methodenlehre, 119 (5'h ed. 2016) with reference 
to Hans Merz, Festschrift for Guhl, 87, 94 et seqq. ( 1950); note also Thomas 
M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre,§ 4 recital 134 (2017). 
25 Roman law did not have any general option to be able to sue for contractual 
obligations. See in detail, Gerhard Kegel, Vertrag und Delikt, 3 et seq. (2002). 
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and the naturallaw26 and Gennan sources of law27• One can find the prin-
ciple expressly in the Motive,28 but not in the BGB, because the rule that 
the concurrence ofwills is contractually bindingwas assumed tobe known 
by the Second Commission and therefore deleted. 
However, the principle of a binding contract has to be lirnited. This is 
why a civil law transaction is voidable if it has come into existence on the 
basis of a threat or deceit, sections 148-150 GRCL. Also in Gennan law 
there is contractual justice by procedural faimess. Threat or bad faith do not 
automatically result in voidness but allow the contestation of the contract 
according to sections 119, 123, 142 BGB. 
b) The protection of physical and proprietary rights and sections 107 et 
seqq. and sections 176 et seqq. GRCL 
The protection of physical and proprietary rights as a general principle in 
section 3 GRCL is substantiated by numerous particular provisions: In sec-
tions 107 et seqq. GRCL there are numerous provisions which reinforce 
legally protected rights. The GRCL arenot restricted to the legally protected 
rights of life, body, health and freedom in section 823 para. 1 BGB, but also 
explicitly protect human dignity, the right to privacy or data security, sec-
tion 109 et seqq. GRCL. Here, the Chinese law is, without doubt, more 
modern than the version ofthe BGB from 1900. Up to the present day, the 
Gennan legislator, for example, has failed to codify the general right ofpri-
vacy despite several initiatives.29 
26 See Christian Freiherr von Wolf!, Grundsätze des Natur- und Völkerrechts, sec-
tion 438 (1754): "When two or more jointly agree on one or more promises, it 
is a contract (pactum or pactio ). " See Klaus-Peter Nanz, Die Entstehung des all-
gemeinen Vertragsbegriffs im 16.-18. Jahrhundert, 149 et seq. (1985); Helmut 
Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, vol. I, 397 et seq. (1985); in detail, Gerhard 
Kegel, Vertrag und Delikt, 3 et seq. (2002). 
27 Sachsenspiegel, Leipziger Ausgabe, I 51 book, Art. 7 ( 1595): "That which a man 
promises, so should he keep"; GIUck, Ausfilhrliche Erläuterungen der Pandek-
ten, nach Hellfeld - ein Kommentar filr meine Zuhörer, vol. 4, 279 et seq. 
(1786), with reference totheGerman legal rule: "A man's word is his bond." 
See also Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, 
vol. 3, 309 (1840). 
28 Entwurf eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches filr das Deutsche Reich, section 77 
(1888). 
29 Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, § 7 recital 72 et seqq. (20 17). 
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The legal consequence in section 120 GRCL is tort liability whicb in return 
is substantiated in sections 176 et seqq. GRCL: Not only the restitution of 
the original state but also the contractual penalty and alternative penalties 
can be comprised if it is stipulated by a law, section 179 GRCL. Such legal 
provisions exist as Wei Shen stated in his contribution to the conference: 
"Punitive damage, as the civil responsibility Iiability form ofpreventing and 
punishing the larger vicious violations through economic means, has been 
explicitly adopted by China's multiple single-Iine legislation. For example, 
Article 47 (Product Liability) oftbe Tort Liability Act, Article 55 (Consum-
ers Fraud) of the Consumer Proteerion Act, and Article 148 (Food Safety 
Responsibility) of the Food Safety Law. The "General Principles of Civil 
Law" will formally put the punitive damages into one ofthe civil responsi-
bility liability forms, which willlikely Iead to punitive damages being used 
more in future single-Iine legislation." The introduction of the punitive 
damages adds a deterrent effect to the claim for damages and thus renders 
them efficiently: It remains to be seen how rights as "human dignity" and 
"privacy" have tobe interpreted, sections 109 et seq. GRCL. Foreign com-
panies such as Apple, Google or Facebook and Chinese companies such as 
Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu use their customers' personal data on a large 
scale. It is till unknown if the extensive basis of liability will Iead to a Iia-
bility risk that is difficult to gauge. Under a legal comparison, two further 
particularities should be pointed out: lfthe human dignity is worth protect-
ing, a violation or exposure is quickly reached. In German law, this basic 
Iaw is treated with special care.30 The general right of privacy is called a 
"framework law"31 and it is differentiated between social, private and inti-
mate sphere. Moreover, a balancing with the other party's interests takes 
place.32 
30 Prevailing view, BVerfG, June 3, 1987, I BvR 313/85, BVerfGE 75, 369, 380: 
"absolutely without a possibility to weigh up the choices (Güterabwägung)"; 
BVerfG, October 10, 1995, I BvR 1476/91 among others, BVerfGE 93, 266, 
293: "the human dignity as the root of all basic rights is not open to balancing 
with any other individual basic right''; Michael Sachs and Wolfram Höfling, GG, 
§ I Rn. 11 (7'h ed. 2014); Jochen von Bemstorff, JZ 905 et seqq. (2013); Horst 
Dreier, GG (Horst Dreier ed., 3'd ed. 2013), Art. 1 I recital46 with further refer-
ences differing view Manfred Baldus, AöR 136, 529 et seqq. (201 1). 
3 I Prevailing view among others Wolfgang Fikentscher and Andreas Heinemann, 
Schuldrecht, recital 1582, 1584 ( I Olh ed. 2006). 
32 See below V. l.c). 
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Ill Substantiation through deduction of legal principles and the creation 
of new legal concepts 
1. Induction and Deduction 
Legal principles serve the development of law with already existing valua-
tions. Figuratively speaking, legal principles link the existing law and the 
law that has yet to be developed. The combination of induction and deduc-
tion serves this purpose33. The Iiterature ofthe deduction oflegal principles 
also favours Induction which is the conclusion from the specific to the gen-
eral. 34 According to Canaris the derivation of a thought comes from several 
legal provisions.35 Deduction is the conclusion from the general to the spe-
cific. In the underlying context it describes how a general legal principle 
operates in the solution of a specific legal prob lern, which is from the prin-
ciple to the rule. As weil as the derivation of a general legal principle 
through induction is judicial development of the law, the legal rules and 
concepts obtained by deduction from the legal principles are development 
ofthe law. 
Further substantiation is possible forming categories, subprinciples and 
similar factual conditions. The same procedure is applied to general stipu-
lations trying to substantiate them with subprinciples, categories and similar 
factual conditions. Now, primarily pure case law is substantiated without 
such a legal basis. 
Eventually, there is one last step to obtain a new legal sentence, e.g. a 
new basis for a claim, from a legal principle through development of the 
law. This is often accompanied by great uncertainty about how to justify 
them with legal dogmatics. A prime example in German law for this is the 
33 More detailed Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, § II recital 19 
et seqq. (2017). 
34 In detail Aristoteles, Aristoteles' Erste Analytiken or: Lehre vom Schluss, chap-
ter 23, 142 (Kirchmann ed. 1877); Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Book I, 
Aphorismus CIV, 82 (1620). 
35 For example Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die Feststellung von Lücken im Gesetz, 
100, 97 et seq. (2nd ed. 1983): "A comrnon legal thought is derived from several 
legal provisions and it is awarded the quality of a general legal one"; Neil Mac-
Corrnick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 153 et seq., 232 et seq. (1978). 
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obligation to contract36, the frustration of contract37, and the contracts with 
protective effect to the benefit of third parties.38 The jurisdiction has sub-
stantiated the newly developed legal rules by categories and sirnilar factual 
conditions. As inherent to the judicial development, the approaches are ex-
perimental and the practical application can sometimes only be developed 
through a trial and error process. 
2. Freedom to contract and binding effect of a contract 
a) Freedom to contract according to sections 5, 7 GRCL 
The freedom to contract is codified in section 5 GRCL with the wording 
that the civil legal relationship can be introduced, changed and terminated 
according to the will of the individual. The new GRCL substantiated the 
obligations to adhere to promises of section 7 GRCL insofar that a contract 
is legally binding, section 119 GRCL. This principle is known in German 
law as "pacta sunt servanda". 
b) Freedom of contract as a consequence of freedom of the wi II und er Ger-
man Law 
Private autonomy includes freedom of contract, but also freedom of owner-
ship (section 903 BGB), freedom to man:y (section 1297 BGB) and testa-
mentary freedom, so the right to freely dispose of one's assets in the event 
36 Reasoning on the basis ofsection 826 BGB RG, November 7, 1931, V 106/31 , 
RGZ 133 , 388, 392 - theater critic or for example BGH, December 2, 1974, ll 
ZR 78/72, BGHZ 63, 282, 285 - compuJsory admission to a monopo1y organi-
zation. See for the newer view that derives an obligation to contract from a qua-
sinegatory injunctive relief Karsten Schrnidt, DRiZ 97, 98 (1977); Reinhard 
Bork, Julius von Staudingers Kommentar zum BGB, pre1iminary note on sec-
tians 145 et seqq. recita12 ( ed. 20 15); Jan Busche, MUnchener Kommentar BGB, 
before section 145 recita121 (6'h ed. 2012); Christian ArmbrUster, BGB, before 
section 145 recita1 29 (Walter Erman ed., J4'h ed. 2014). 
37 See for example BGH, February 25, 1993, VII 24/92, BGHZ 121 , 378 recita1 
48. 
38 Before RG, February 10, 1930, V1270/29, RGZ 127,218,221- Gas meter. 
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of death (section 1937 BGB).39 Freedom of contract in turn includes free-
dom to conclude contracts, freedom of contractual partner, freedom of con-
tent, and generally freedom of form, but also freedom to amend and can-
ce1.40 The concept of freedom of contract was first introduced in the mid-
J9th century. 41 Freedom of contract is based on the intentions of the par-
ties. 42 The parties can determine their legal relationships between them-
selves at their discretion, insofar as there are no conflicting legal provisions. 
The parties are generally responsible for agreeing to the essentialia ne-
gotii, the essential components of the contract, such as the object of pur-
chase and the purchase price. The price is not controlled. The parties may 
also conclude unreasonable contracts.43 That corresponds with the liberal 
approach of Adam Smith, who described the market as the " invisible hand", 
on which supply and demand regulate themselves.44 The underlying idea is 
that the conflict of interests between the parties Iead to a correct result 
through the contract; one could refer to the "guaranteed correctness" of the 
negotiation.45 Hobbes accurately stressed that it is the parties who are best 
39 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuches fUr das deutsche 
Reich, vol. 2, 2 (2nd ed. 1896). 
40 Reinhard Bork, Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, section 661 
(41h ed. 2016); Manfred Wolf and Jörg Neuner, Allgemeiner Teil des BUrgerli-
chen Rechts, section 10, § 33 et seq. (JJth ed. 2016); Thomas M.J. Möllers, JuS 
1191 , 1192(1999). 
41 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Das Recht des Obligationenrechts, vol. 2, sections 
72-78 (1853); Bemhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, vol. 2, sec-
tion 312, fn. 5 with further citations (81h ed. 1900); see Werner Scherrer, Die 
geschichtliche Entwicklung des Prinzips der Vertragsfreiheit, 33 et seq. ( 1948); 
Joachim RUckert, Naturrecht und Rechtsphilosophie in der Neuzeit, 135, 145 et 
seq. (Diethelrn Klippe! ed., 1997). 
42 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuches fllr das deutsche 
Reich, vol. 2, 126 (2"d ed. 1896): "Legal transaction in the sense ofthe Draft is 
a personal declaration of intent, aimed at emphasising a legal outcome, which 
occurs under the legal system as a result, because it is intended." 
43 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] of Cologne, December 8, 
2006, 19 U 109/06, MMR 2007, 446, 448: Purehase of a sugar beet harvester 
worth 60,000 euros in an eBay auction for 51 euros; agreeing, Mare-Philippe 
Weller, Die Vertragstreue, 170 (2009). 
44 Adam Srnith, Wealth of Nations, vol. Ill, book IV, chap. li (9'h ed. 1799), Of 
Restraints upon the lmportation from foreign Countries of such Goods as can be 
produced at Horne, p. 181. 
45 Walter Schmidt-Rimpler, 147 ACP 130, 149 et seq. (1941); Walter Schmidt-
Rimpler, Festschrift for Raiser 3, 5 et seq. (1974); Manfred Lieb, 178 AcP 196, 
206 (1978). 
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able to determine the value ofthe item.46 This concept has been taken up by 
the BGB. For example, in addition to the conspicuous disparity between 
benefit and consideration as a further prerequisite to establish usury, section 
138 para. 2 BGB requires that freedom of choice is impaired, such as with 
the exploitation of plight. This corresponds with the legal position in nu-
merous other legal systems.47 Thus only procedural fairness was to be en-
sured, guaranteed process, by protection against mistak.e or fraud (sections 
119, 123 et seq., 142 et seq. BGB).48 
c) The justification of a binding contract (pacta sunt servanda) 
As the principle of a binding contract (pacta sunt servanda) cannot be tak.en 
directly from the law, one must derive it from the law indirectly by induc-
tion: Thus a person who offers to conclude a contract with another person 
is "bound by the offer" section 145 BGB. The contract and the contractual 
obligation follow from the deliberate statement to accept an offer. Without 
consensus, this Ieads to disagreement under sections 154 et seq. BGB. The 
mistak.e - the conflict of intention and declaration - is initially irrelevant for 
the binding effect. The contract is valid despite the mistak.e and only permits 
a challenge under sections 119, 142 BGB.49 The binding contract can bc 
discerned from the synallagmatic fulfilment obligations of the individual 
types of contract50 or the general fulfilment obligations at the time of per-
formance (section 271 BGB), the right ofretention (section 273 BGB), and 
impossibility (section 275 BGB). Moreover, good faith (section 242 BGB) 
can be used to justify the obligation for contractual fidelity_si Moreover, 
under the 2001 reform of the law of Obligations, freedom of contract and 
46 Vividly, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chap. 15, 74 (2"d ed. 1886): "The 
value ofall things contracted for, is measured by the appetite ofthe contractors: 
and therefore the just value isthat which they be contented to give." 
47 Art. 21 OR (Swiss Code ofObligations); Art. 282 port. cc (Portuguese c6digo 
civil); Art. 388 Polish Civil Code of23/04/1964. 
48 On this procedural concept of faimess, see Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, 
Einfllhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung, 320 et seq. (3rd ed. 1996). 
49 Sibylle Hafer, HKK-BGB, with section 145, § 10 (2003). 
50 Such as from the contract of sale (section 433), rental agreement (section 535), 
contract for work (section 633) or contract for services (section 631 BGB). 
51 BGH, December 17, 1982, V ZR 306/81 , BGHZ 86, 167, 171- increase in a 
ground rent in the absence of a contractual adjustrnent clause. 
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the binding contract can be established by sections 241 , 311 para. 1 BGB.52 
The binding contract can be derived from the provisions cited by induction. 
3. Private autonomy as self-determination for both parties 
a) Self-determination ofthe individualsandmutual self-deterrnination 
With the presentation of the legal doctrine above, too much consideration 
was given to freedom of contract, and conversely self-determination was 
neglected. Self-deterrnination is a prerequisite for the freedom of contract. 
The following wording is already contained in the Motiven zum BGB: "The 
legal system cannot allow free self-deterrnination to be impaired in legal 
transactions in an unlawful way."53 And the first sentence in Flume's work 
"Rechtsgeschäft" reads: "Private autonomy is the name given to the princi-
ple of self-organisation of legal relationships by the individual according to 
his/her will."54 He continued verbatim: "For as far as self-determination 
reaches, there is no external control. The deliberate decision is valid because 
it is intended and the will of the individual is respected as such. Private 
autonomous organisation requires, insofar as it is recognised by law, no jus-
tification other than that the individual intends it."55 
Self-determination is often only referred to in relation to one party. 56 
However, the principle of self-determination obviously applies for both 
52 Andreas Their, HKK-BGB, section 3111, § 1 (2007); Mare-Philippe Weller, Die 
Vertragstreue, 170 (2009). 
53 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines BUrgerlichen Gesetzbuches filr das Deutsche 
Reich (Statements on the Draft of a Civil Code fortheGerman Reich), vol. 1, 
204 (1888); in German it says: "Die Rechtsordnung kann nicht gestatten, daß 
die freie Selbstbestimmung auf rechtsgeschäftlichem Gebiete in wiederrechtli-
cher Weise beeinträchtigt wird." 
54 Wem er Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, vol. 2, I ( 4 ed. 1992); 
as above Werner Flume, Festschrift 100 Jahre DJT, vol. 1, 135, 136 et seq., 143 
( 1960); agreeing Cl aus-Wilhelm Canaris, 200 AcP, 273, 277 (2000); Reinhard 
Bork, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, § 99 (4th ed. 2016); 
Joachim RUckert, HKK-BGB, with section I§ 108 (2003) speaks of"drumbeat." 
See also BVertG, May 13, 1986, I BvR 1542/84, BVertGE 72, 155, 170. 
55 Werner Flume, Festschrift 100 Jahre DJT, vol. I, 135, 141 (1960). 
56 Jan Busche, München er Kommentar BOB, section 145 Paragraph 6 and the evi-
dence in section 12 fn. 65 (7'h ed. 20 15); Manfred Wolf and Jörg Neuner, Allge-
meiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, section 10, § 30 (I Jlh ed. 2016). 
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sides. Self-detennination of both sides then also means protection against 
extemal control.57 Flume rightly emphasises that the contract requires mu-
tual self-determination and that an inequality of power or factual monopoly 
position Ieads to one-sided extemal control. The concept of mutual self-
detennination as part ofprivate autonomy was met with approvaJ.58 Flume 
had already fonnulated the following in 1960: 
"Insofar as individuals are provided the right to regulate legal relation-
ships by mutual self-determination, that is by contract, in our legal system, 
it is based on the requirement that the individuals face one another with the 
power of self-detennination, and do not enter into contracts by the power 
ofone-sided extemal control instead ofmutual self-detennination. Compul-
sion and private autonomy are incompatible with one another. However, it 
is private autonomy's etemal dilemma that it is continually brought into 
question by an unequal distribution ofpower."59 
b) Derivation of the principle of self-detennination from the BGB and the 
constitution 
One can now discem this principle from an indirect third-party effect of the 
fundamental rights. ln the decision on the guarantee of relatives without 
assets, the BVerfG stressed that Art. 2 para. 1 GG guarantees the "self-de-
termination ofthe individual in legallife•>60 as part of private autonomy. lt 
also required such an understanding of private autonomy in several deci-
sions, where there would have been a "structural inequality of bargaining 
57 Norbert Reich, JZ 609 (1997). 
58 Franz Jilrgen Säcker, Milnchener Kommentar BGB, lntroduction Paragraph 37 
(7'b ed. 20 15). 
59 Wem er Flurne, Festschrift I 00 Jahre DJT, vol. I, 135, 143 ( 1960); similarly Kar! 
Larenz, Schuldrecht, vol. I, section 4, 41 ( 14. ed. 1987): "free self-determination 
of each ofthe two contracting parties". 
60 BVerfG, October 19, 1993, I BvR 567 inter alia, BVertDE 89, 214, 231- guar-
antee agreements referring to Hans-Uwe Erichsen, HdB Staatsrecht, vol. 6, sec-
tion 152 paragraph 58 et seq. (Hans-Uwe Erichsen ed. 1989), which in fu. 195, 
197, again refers to Werner Flurne (fu. 59). 
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power'' or a "disrupted contractual parity".61 In terms of a constitution-ori-
ented (reinforcing) interpretation, there is nothing to preclude this.62 
However, it is more convincing to interpret the principle of self-determi-
nation as part ofthe private autonomy ofboth parties and thus as a civillaw 
legal principle. This principle can be found in the BOB in the intention the-
ory of the 19th century, then standardised in section 133 ("to ascertain the 
true intention"), and the error rules (section 119 et seq.). Self-determination 
is also guaranteed in family and probate law.63 Seen historically, the BOB 
did not only want to introduce freedom, but also an equal legal freedom64 
without differentiation between persons. Through European law the cancel-
lation (section 312 BOB) was also added, which strengthened the self-de-
termination ofthe consumer. Equallegal freedom thus means the equal use 
offreedom for all. 
4. Deduction: The doctrinallegaljustification ofthe various legal doctrines 
where the right of self-determination is absent 
a) Obligation to contract and Iack of self-determination 
The obligation to contract can be justified from private autonomy itself: At 
a fust glance, the obligation to contract is opposed to freedom of contract 
because one side loses the freedom to conclude contracts referred to 
above.65 However, that is only applicable when one only considers the op-
posing party to the contract, the party refusing to accept, in isolation. Free-
dom of contract, however, is a conditioned freedom which is aimed at ful-
filling mutual interests. If freedom of contract includes the self-determined 
decision of both sides, then private autonomy also allows the freedom to 
61 Moreover, it referred to the welfare state principle (Art. 20 (I), 28 (I) Sentence 
1 GG), see BVerfGE 89, 214, 231 et seq. (fn. 60)- guarantee agreements. 
62 Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, section 7, § 73 (2017). 
63 Sections 1821, 1822 in conjunction with 1643 BGB; section 1901 (I) Sentence 
2 BGB; section 2064 BGB. 
64 Joachim Rückert, HKK-BGB, with section I,§ 43 et seq. (2003), who speaks of 
a principle of equallegal freedom; agreeing Sibylle Hofer, Vertragsfreiheit am 
Scheideweg, 11 (2006). 
65 Werner Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, vol. 2, 611 (4th ed. 
1992); Jörg Neuner, Privatrecht und Sozialstaat 287 (1999): "because it hereby 
involves the opposite of self-determined legal consequences" . 
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form a contract and thus the rigbt, under certain conditions, to force conclu-
sion of a contract. Freedom of contract is impaired when there is no 
choice.66 The reliance on the service clarifies the Iack ofself-determination, 
when there is an obligation to contract.67 The self-determination ofthe party 
wishing to contract is severely restricted in the absence of alternatives, such 
that the self-determination of the other party is, by way of exception, re-
stricted. The Obligation to conclude a contract in this respect establishes a 
legal obligation which includes the obligation to give a declaration of intent 
airned at the conclusion of a contract.68 
b) Price controls under section 138 para. 1 BGB for contracts which inter-
vene in the self-determined life with severe freedom-restricting conse-
quences 
Formally, the judgments on price controls for contracts69 are not particu-
larly convincing because the presumption of a reprehensible attitude in the 
event of a disparity between benefit and consideration only constitutes an 
apparent justification70 and fiction71 • In terms of content, such judgments 
aretobe rejected because they contradict the BGB. The wording ofsection 
138 para. 2 BGB also requires, with the need for a conspicuous disparity, 
exploitation of plight and therefore does not directly provide any general 
66 Thus JosefKohler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 96 (1909); Jan Busche, Pri-
vatautonomie und Kontrahierungszwang, 125 et seq. (1999), in addition to the 
legally protected interests, mentions the dependence on the provider. 
67 Lorenz Fastrich speaks of "existential dependence", Richterliche Inhaltskon-
trolle im Privatrecht, 232 et seq. (1992). On dependence, see Walter Schmidt-
Rimpler, 147 AcP 130, 157 fn. 34 (1941). 
68 Christian Armbrüster, BGB, with section I 45 paragraph 3 I (Walter Erman ed., 
J41h ed. 20 I 4 ). 
69 BGH, November 26, I 997, VII! ZR 322/96, BB 1998, 393 - slot machine; BGH, 
November 10, 2016, IX ZR I 19/14, ZIP 2017, 2479 recital 19 et seq. - immo-
rality ofa fee agreement, furthers comments Volker Römermann, EWiR 2017, 
45 et seq. who criticises why exactly the quintuple shall justify immorality; 
BGH, July 10, 1986, III ZR 135/85, BGHZ 98, 174, 178; BGH, January 19, 
2001, V ZR 437/99, BGHZ 146, 298, 302. 
70 Helmut Koziol, 188 AcP 183 , 207 (1988). 
71 Theo Mayer-Maly, Das Bewußtsein der Sittenwidrigkeit, 12 (1971); Theo Ma-
yer-Maly, Festschrift for Röhricht, 395, 400, 404 et seq. (1983); Wemer Ebke, 
Festschrift for Westermann, 183, 193 (2008). 
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price controls. lt is thereby fundamentally left to the contracting parties to 
detennine the content and extent ofthe essential components ofthe contract 
(essentialia negotii) and to specify the price. Moreover, it would be system-
atically inconsistent if an unlawful threat or a fraudulent deception were 
"only" to lead to a right to void, but a particularly large disparity in benefit 
would lead ipso iure to invalidity under section 138 BGB.72 Furthennore, it 
would be counterproductive if anyone were to be able to rely on judicial 
price control: The consequence would be a multitude of imprudent contracts 
being concluded.73 
According to the view represented here, simple contracts of sale or con-
tracts of service are not subject to the immorality and price control of sec-
tion 138 BGB.74 Instead ofemploying an immorality review ofthe relevant 
market, however, the breach of a duty to inform 75 or fault in conclusion of 
the contract (culpa in contrahendo) can intervene in such a case.76 The BGH 
therefore correctly rejected immorality when a purchaser had acquired col-
lectors' coins at a price ofDM 20,000, and could then only resell them for 
the value ofthe metal at DM 2,250.77 The market, and not the judge, thus 
fundamentally detennines the reasonableness ofthe price. 
Situations of imbalance can only be relevant when the consequences are 
exceptionally onerous and the self-detennination is therefore massively im-
paired.78 Contracts restriet the self-determined life when they act to severely 
72 Rainald Maaß, NJW 3467, 3468 (2001); Thomas Fikenauer, Festschrift for 
Westermann 183, 205 (2008). 
73 Horst Bartholomeyczik, 166 AcP 30, 62 (1966). 
74 Also opposed, Theo Mayer-Maly, Festschrift for Larenz, 395, 398 et seq. (1983), 
Thomas Fikenauer, Festschrift for Westermann, 183 et seq. (2008), Joachim 
Rückert, HKK-BGB, with section I § 112 (2003). 
75 Thus Reinhard Singer, JZ 195, 197 (2001) against the opinion ofthe BGH col-
lector's coin (fn. 77). 
76 BGH, December22, 1999, Vlll ZR 111/99, NJW 2000, 1254, 1255 -collector's 
coin. 
77 BGH, December 22, 1999, Vlli ZR 111/99, NJW 2000, 1254, 1255-collector's 
coin. The hire purchase of poollbilliards equipment at 2.5 times the value was 
also not imrnoral, BGH, January 24, 1979, VIII ZR 16178, WM 1979, 491,492. 
See also above, ill.2.b). 
78 BVerfG, October 19, 1993, I BvR 567, 1044/89, BVerfGE 89,214, 232 - Gua-
rantee contract; Ritgen, JZ, 114, 119 (2002); Sibylle Hofer, Vertragsfreiheit am 
Scheideweg, 23 (2006); JosefDrexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des 
Verbrauchers, 208, 296 (1998); Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Festschrift for Lerche, 
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restriet freedom. It is not justice, but rather injustice which is the standard 
for a legal intervention. The exploitation of a position of power or the re-
striction of freedom are also recognised as grounds for attribution within 
the general clause in section 138 BGB. After conclusion ofthe contact, one 
can include cases of loss of perspective79 or the restriction of freedom in 
existential areas of life.80 The case law here has already developed groups 
of cases. For transactions of existential importance, exceptionally, there is 
price control. In German Law, this is relevant for rent, the purchase ofprop-
erty, or wages.81 Self-determination thus does not only refer to the exercise 
of a declaration of intent, but rather also the self-determined life, which 
should ensure that the wage is generally sufficient to live on, that tenancy 
law protects the tenant's social environment, and the purchase of a immor-
ally inflated property does not drive the purchaser into the modern debtors' 
prison82• 
c) A freedom-restricting Iack of eq uivalence as frustration of the contract 
Also the legal doctrine of the frustration of contract is a weakening of the 
binding effect ofthe contract, that is, the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The doctrine of clausula rebus sie stantibus means that every contract is 
only binding for as long as the circumstances that were decisive for its sign-
ing have not changed fundamentally. 83 The requirements and groups of 
873, 883 et seq. ( 1993); Manfred Wolf and Jörg Neuner, Allgemeiner Teil des 
Bürgerlichen Rechts, § 10 recital 30 ( ll'h ed. 2016). 
79 Fora different view, however, Manfred Wolfand Jörg Neun er, Allgemeiner Teil 
des Bürgerlichen Rechts, section 10, §55 et seq. ( I Jlh ed. 2016), which under-
stands this as "immaterial property rights ofthe social principle". 
80 Wolfgang Enderlein, Rechtspaternalismus und Vertragsrecht, 293 et seq. 
(1996). 
81 Similar examples in Manfred Wolf and Jörg Neuner; Allgemeiner Teil des Bür-
gerlichen Rechts, section 46, §52 (JJth ed. 2016). 
82 A debtors' prison was a private prison until the late Middle Ages and then a 
public prison for people who had not fulfilled their payment obligations, Steffen 
Breßler, Schuldknechtschaft und Schuldturm, 88, 115 et seq. (2004). 
83 It can already be found in the Codex Maximilianeus bavaricus civilis [CMBC] 
and in the General State Laws for the Prussian States [ALR] and also in other 
codes, 4'h part, chapter 15, § 12 CMBC: "and because [ ... ] all connections tacitly 
contain the clausulam sie stantibus"; 151 part, 5th title, sections 377-380 ALR; as 
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cases of frustration of contract were developed inductively withln 80 years. 
Two key features are crucial: The background is, on the one hand, again the 
observation that courts cannot and should not review equivalence with frus-
tration of contract. On the other hand, only in extreme circumstances, 
namely, Situations which were not discernible for the contracting parties on 
conclusion of the contract and whlch massively disrupt the balance of the 
contract, an adjustment to the contract can be made.84 Justice is thus speci-
fied as a legal concept through the principle of self-determination. This 
specifies the prerequisites offrustration of contract. The disruption may not 
fall within one of the contracting parties' areas of risk. In the event of a 
disruption of equivalence, it requires that the sphere of freedom is existen-
tially impaired. It concerns cases which are sirnply incompatible with law 
andjustice.85 The disruptions ofequivalence rnust therefore clearly be more 
than 50% ofthe market price86 and again have severely restrictive irnpacts 
on freedorn. 
IV. Lex superior - Primacy of Law 
1. The legal situation in Germany 
a) The principle Iex superior 
In the 1930s, Merk/ invented the hierarchy ofthe law87 which stipulates that 
the legal system is built on different Ievels of legal provisions that are 
weil Art. 357 Polish Civil Code. [n detail see Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische 
Methodenlehre, § II recital 3 7 (20 17). 
84 Bundestag document no. 14/6040, 176: "gross disparity with the creditor's in-
terest in performance"; Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, JZ 499, 502 (2001). See BGH, 
February 25, 1993, Vll 24/92, BGHZ 121 , 378, 392 § 54: "when it concems 
such a drastic change that adherence to the original provision would Iead to an 
intolerable outcome which can plainly no Iongerbe reconciled with law and jus-
tice, and adherence to the original contractual provision would therefore be un-
reasonable for the affected party". Sirnilarly Mare-Philippe Weller, Die Vertrag-
streue, 298 et seq (2009). 
85 Thus the formulation in Horst EidenrnUller, Jura 824, 829 (2001). 
86 Devaluation by more than 60%, see BGH, September 18, 1992, V 116/91 , 
BGHZ 119, 220, 222- increase in the ground rent; on this group of cases see 
Hein Kötz, Vertragsrecht section 1014 et seq. (2"d ed. 2012). 
87 Adolf Julius Merk!, Festschrift for Kelsen, 252, 272 et seqq (1931 ). 
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ranked in a super- and subordinate relationship. lnsofar there is a hierarchy 
of provisions. The higher Ievel is the reason for existence of the respective 
lower Ievel and regulates the procedure as to how the lower provision comes 
into existence and, ifneeded, also its content. The doctrine ofthe hierarchy 
of the law has become prevailing.88 The legal consequences of the hierar-
chical structure are considerable. Iftwo provisions that are per se valid, but 
are derived from different sources and regulate the samelegal question, cre-
ate a direct contradiction, then this gives rise to a collision of provisions. 89 
A collision arises when two different legal provisions regulate the same le-
gal problem. If provisions collide, there is no balancing of the individual 
provisions. On the contrary, one rather applies an unambiguous priority 
rule. The higher-ranking law takes precedence over the lower-ranking law, 
Latin: Iex superior derogat /egi inferiori.90 In modern times, this concept 
developed from the observation that the higher-ranking legislator is able to 
impede or abolish a contradicting law ofthe lower-ranking legislator.9 1 
b) Higher rank of rules on competences 
Gerrnany is a federal constitutional state. According to the federal law the 
state law needs to be respected. Art. 31 GG is succinctly phrased: "Federal 
law precedes state law". Art. 31 GG derives from the states' self-conception 
88 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 228 et seqq. (2nd ed. 1960); Klaus F Röhl and 
Hans Christian Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 308 et seq. (3'd ed. 2008); Bemd 
ROthers, Christian Fischer and Axel Birk, Rechtstheorie, recital 272 et seqq. 
(9th ed. 2016); Franz Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, 
201 (2nd ed. 1991); Ernst A. Kramer, Juristische Methodenlehre, 96 (5'h ed. 
2016); dift"ering view for example Gurrther Teubner, 2 Soziale Systeme, 229, 
23 I ( 1996): "terrific self-deception of the law" . 
89 BVerfG, June 4, 1969, 2 BvR 173/66 among others, BVerfGE 26, 116, 135; 
Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. I, 720 (2. ed. 
1984). 
90 in the words of Adolf Julius Merk!, Festschrift for Kelsen, 252, 276 (1931 ): "A 
legal rule derogating another legal rule, while this other legal rule does not 
equally derogate it, is for this reason higher-ranking and the legal rule that is 
derogated is lower-ranking compared tothelegal rule that derogates." 
91 Lex superior tollat Iegern inferioris, see Sebastiano Medici, De legibus, statutis, 
et consuetudine, 90 (Sebastiano Medici et al. eds., 1574); see also Jan Schröder, 
Recht als Wissenschaft, 21 (2nd ed. 20 12). 
77 
Thomas M.J. Möllers 
and is a classical Iex superior principle. 92 Comparable rules can be found 
in Switzerland, Australia, Canada and indirectly also in the US Constitu-
tion.93 Subsequently, the entire federallaw precedes the entire state law. It 
would therefore generally be possible that a provision ofthe state constitu-
tion was considered void because it is inconsistent with an ordinance ofthe 
federal government. Art. 31 GG is, however, mostly superseded by more 
specific provisions, as for example the legislative power of sections 70 et 
seqq. GG. 94 
This conflict can also arise between the EU and the member states. Under 
certain conditions European law precedes the national law, which is called 
primacy of application. The result is that nationallaw may not be applied.95 
c) Primacy of the Constitution 
A subsequent result isthat ordinary law must be interpreted in light ofthe 
constitution because it is higher-ranking than ordinary law. The constitu-
tion-oriented and constitutional interpretation must be distinguished from 
the constitutional development ofthe law.96 
2. The Primacy of Law in Chinese Law 
a) The Primacy of Law according to Art. 95 Legislation Law 
ln Chinese law the principle of primacy is also known: it is codified in 
Art. 95 Legislation Law which is worded: 97 
92 1t is insofar referred to ranking norrns, see Peter M. Huber, GO, Art. 31 recital 7 
(Michael Sachs and Peter M Huber eds., Ti' ed. 2014); differing view Horst 
Dreier, GO, Art. 31 recital 18. (Horst Dreier ed., 3rd ed. 20 15), 
93 S. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. I ; art I, sec. 8 para. 18; art. 6 para. 2; U.S. Const. 
amend. X; Winfried Brugger, Einfilhrung in das öffentliche Recht der USA, 31 
et seqq. (2nd ed. 2001). 
94 Besides Art. 70 et seqq., 84 para 1 p. 4, 125a para. I p. 2 and Art. 142 GO; Peter 
M. Huber, GO, Art. 31 recital 5 ff. (Michael Sachs and Peter M. Huber eds., 
7'h ed. 2014). 
95 Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, § 8 recital 4 et seqq. (20 17). 
96 Thomas M.J. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre, § 7 recital 37 et seqq. (2017); 
Thomas M.J. Möllers, Festschrift for Vedder, 721 et seqq. (2017). 
97 This reference is owed to Jin Jing. 
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"When local provisions and rules are inconsistent, the relevant organ will make a 
ruling in accordance with the following provisions on the scope ofauthority: 
(I) When a new generat provision and an old special provision enacted by the sarne 
agency are inconsistent, the enacting agency shall make the ruling; 
(2) When local provisions and administrative rules are inconsistent regarding the 
same matter and the applicable provision cannot be determined, the State Council 
will issue an opinion and where the State Council finds that the local decree shall 
apply, the local decree shall be applied in the local jurisdiction; where the State 
Council deems that the administrative rule shall apply it shall request the Standing 
Committee ofNational People's Congress to make a ruling; 
(3) When there is an inconsistency on a matter between departmental rules or be-
tween departrnental rules and local provisions the State Council will make a deci-
sion. When an administrative regulation enacted pursuant to authorization and a law 
are inconsistent and the applicable provision cannot be deterrnined the Standing 
Committee ofNational People' s Congress will make a ruling." 
As weil as in Gennany, Europe and the USA it is recognised that the com-
petences of different governmental authorities can conflict with each other, 
which can be solved by means ofthe hierarchy of norms. 
b) Chinese Law and the Constitution, section l GRCL 
In China, however, the question as to how to interpret the constitution has 
not been solved yet. For instance, it is hardly clarified if only the Standing 
Committee ofthe National People's Congress or the courts are allowed to 
interpret the constitution.98 Also the question whether there is a hierarchy 
of several legal sources hardly seems to be clarified.99 It is also not clear 
whether there is a constitutional interpretation in Chinese law.100 The basic 
rights of the constitution are mainJy perceived as mere agenda that are not 
legally binding and subsequently not enforceable either.101 
98 For an overview see Hui Huang, Juristische Methodenlehre in China und Osta-
sien, 131 , 152 (Yuanshi Bu ed. 2016). 
99 Tothis Zhang, I Univ. Bologna L. Rev. 106, 117 (2016). 
I 00 Sheng Zhang, China L.Science II 0 et seqq. (2008); Hui Huang, Juristische Me-
thodenlehre in China und Ostasien, 131, 152 (Yuanshi Bu ed. 2016). 
I 01 One court dismissed a case regarding a fundamental rights violation, see Qi 
Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi et al.: Dispute over lnfringement of a Citizen's Basic 
Right to receive Education protected by Constitution Through lnfringement of 
Right ofName, Supreme People's Court Gazette, 2001, Issue 5, 158-161 (?r.3i 
~w••••~~m•~a~~•~m~~&~~0~~-·~~* a~~•• 
«llilt.A~~Il1't0*-»2001~~5WJ, ~ 158-161~). 
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Ifthe constitution is understood as a legal system that describes the tasks of 
the People's Party is it clear that now basic rights must be searched for in 
another codification, namely the GRCL. ln the current version of the 
GRCL, the basic rights cannot only be perceived as legal assets that private 
third parties may not harm. They can be perceived as basic rights that the 
government has to respect. This is suggested by the fact that no one may 
harm them, section 3 GRCL. A wording that the absolute legal assets may 
not be harmed is doubtful. Examining basic rights it is recogoised that the 
infringement of a basic rights is legal if it can be justified. Basic rights are 
always limited by the basic rights ofthird parties. The claim to absoluteness 
is therefore excessive. 
A second remarkable particularity is: in German law the constitution and 
therefore the basic rights are higher-ranking than the ordinary civil law. 
However, basic rights are directly applicable. In relation to Public Law and 
Criminal Law a certain priority is given to Civil Law. Among several claims 
the civil claim to damages is preceding, sections 187 GRCL. The relation 
ofbasic rights and ordinary law should therefore not be examined as a rela-
tion of constitution and private law, but within the GRCL. 
V. Resolution of conflicts between principles through balancing - worldng 
with basic laws 
I. No general principle ofproportionality in the German BGB 
a) Affirmation of a principle of proportionality in Civil Law 
lt is heavily debated if a principle of proportionality exists in Civil Law. 
The BGH states that the principle of proportionality "govems the entire 
Civil Law" 102 and the German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht 
- BAG) even calls it a "superordinate legal principle ofthe private law."103 
102 BGH, February II , 1987, IVaZR 194/85, BGHZ 100, 60, 64-section 71 VVG; 
seealso BGH, December 6, 1989, JVa ZR 249/88, BGHZ 109,306, 312-grave 
violation ofpiety. 
103 BAG, June 6, 1980, I AZR 822179, BAGE 33, 140 recita!IIO- Labor Dispute 
Law. 
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Alsoapart oftegal Iiterature affums the vaHdity ofthe principle ofpropor-
tionality for the Civil Law.104 As the legislative branch is also bound by the 
constitutional order according to Art. 1 para. 3 GG under Civil Law, the 
principle of proportionality applies. 105 This shall also be valid for the juris-
diction of Civil Law. 106 Methodologically, the principle of proportionality 
is tried to be derived from section 242.107 According to Canaris, under cur-
rent law, a young person should not be obligated to pay the extremely high 
damages resulting from the destruction of an important artwork because 
such a claim violates the freedom of action and the prohibition of exces-
siveness, which also applies in Civil Law.108 
b) Rejection ofthe principle ofproportionality in Civil Law 
The opposing view, however, criticises a general application ofthe princi-
ple of proportionality. 109 It emphasizes the autonomy of Civil Law: First, 
104 Hans Hanau, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, 121 et seq. (2004), Mi-
chael Stürner, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im Schuldvertragsrecht, 
442 (20 I 0); Claudia Schubert, Münchener Kommentar BGB, section 242 recital 
417 et seqq. (?"' ed. 20 16); Reiner Schulze, BGB, section 242 recital 33 (Reiner 
Schulze et al. eds., 9'h ed. 20 17), on abuse of rights respectively; Jörg Neun er, 
NJW 2000, 1822, 1824 for the non-transactional sector; for Public Law: 
Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, GG Art. 20 (constitutional state) recital 197 (Horst 
Dreier ed., 3'd ed. 20 15). 
105 Manfred Wolfand Jörg Neuner, AJlgemeiner Teil des BUrgerlichen Rechts, § 2 
recital 2 ( ll'h ed. 20 16). 
106 Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, JuS 161 , 162 (1989). 
107 Helmut Köhler, GRUR 82 (1996); Dirk Looschelders and Dirk Olzen, BGB, 
section 242 recital 277 et seqq. (Staudinger ed., revised ed. 20 15). 
108 Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, JZ 993, 1001 et seq. (1987); Claus-Wi1helm Canaris, 
JZ 494, 497 (1988). 
I 09 Dieter Medicus, 192 AcP 35, 69 et seq. (1992); Detlef Merten, Festschrift for 
Schambeck, 349, 364 et seq. (1994); Christian Grüneberg, BGB, section 242 
recital 54 (Otto Palandt ed., 771h ed. 20 18); Marcus Bieder, Das ungeschriebene 
Verhältnismäßigkeilsprinzip als Schranke privater Rechtsausübung, 27 et seqq. 
(2007); Lorenz Kähler, Verhältnismäßigkeit, 210, 212 et seqq. (Matthias Jesta-
edt and Oliver Lepsius eds., 2015); For Public Law: DetlefMerten, HGR, vol. 
3, § 68 recital 22 (2009). 
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according to this view, the legislator has already perfectly balanced the in-
terests. 110 Second, the principle of proportionality would only be efficient 
to avert a public interference, but it would not be suitable among private 
persons because both parties could claim their basic rights. 111 Therefore, the 
principle of proportionality is not applicable or only strictly lirnited: As an 
expression ofself-determination the parties can generally generate contracts 
at will. The objective principle of equivalence does not apply. The BGB 
deliberately decided against a price control, the "laesio enormis" is only 
applicable in rare cases. 112 Under Property Law the owner can make altera-
tions at his or her will. 113 The owner may destroy the property without being 
prohibited from doing so. 114 Due to testamentary freedom the spouse or rel-
atives can be excluded from the inheritance; only the claim to the legal por-
tion of an estate is protected. 
c) Own opinion 
It can be agreed to the indirect effect of the basic rights under Civil Law, 
and that under Civil Law, the legislator is bound by the basic rights and 
therefore by the prohibition of excessiveness. This, however, does not result 
in the direct application of the basic rights under Civil Law.115 Moreover, 
the just mentioned provisionsarenot eligible for generalisation116 as they 
110 Dieter Medicus, 192 AcP 35, 37 (1992); U1rich Preis, Festschrift for Dietrich 
429, 433 (1999). 
111 Dieter Medicus, 192 AcP 35, 59 (1992); Ulrich Preis, Festschrift for Dietrich 
429, 435, 438 (1999). 
112 Also Thomas Raiser, Festschrift Deutscher Juristentag, vol. I, 101, 129 et seqq. 
( 1960); Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242 BOB, 
38 (1956); DetlefMerten, HGR, vol. 3, § 68 recital22 (2009); Lorenz Kähler, 
Verhältnismäßigkeit, 210, 225 (Matthias Jestaedt and Oliver Lepsius eds., 
2015). Differing section 56 para I sentence 2 VwVfG: "The consideration must 
be reasonable under the entire circumstances and materially connected to the 
contractual performance ofthe authority." See above Ill.2.b). 
113 This principle has been carried on for hundreds ofyears. 
114 Lorenz Kähler, Verh!l.ltnismä.ßigkeit, 210, 227 (Matthias Jestaedt and Oliver 
Lepsius eds., 2015). 
115 Günter Dürig, Festschrift for Nawiasky 157, 176 et seqq. (1956); BVerfG, Janu-
ary 15, 1958, 1BvR400/51 , BVerfGE 7, 198,206 et seq. 
116 Detlef Merten, HGR, vol. 3, § 68 recital 22 (2009); Lorenz K!l.hler, Verhältnis-
mäßigkeit 210, 217 et seqq. (Matthias Jestaedt and Oliver Lepsius eds., 20 15). 
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only relate to the defence of rights or the extent of enforcement. The refer-
ence to section 242 BGB is not convincing either, because this provision 
under the tradition of the Roman legal bonas fides 117 only aims at certain 
obligations within a creditor-debtor relation without forcing a balancing of 
all the interests affected.118 Randomly correcting legal provisions with the 
principle ofproportionality exceed the Iimits ofperrnissible development of 
the law: The "art vandal", who intentionally destroys a valuable painting, is 
Iiable because the ownership of the injured person is clear. Moreover, the 
culprit is adequately protected by Bankruptcy Law.119 
Establishing a balance of interests is incumbent upon the Jegislator. 120 
The legislator can clearly establish a better balance of interests than an ex-
amination of the proportionality by the courts. 121 The examination of pro-
portionality and its criteria of suitability, necessity and proportionality in 
the narrow sense would restriet the private autonomy in a manner contrary 
to the system. 122 Opposing interests are imminent to synallagmatic con-
tracts as for instance the purchase and service contract: One party wants to 
buy low, the other party wants to sell high. The judge is generallynot inter-
ested in whether the bottle of Coca Cola is sold for 50 Cents or 5 Euros. 
Therefore, the individual generally does not have to act respecting any fi-
duciary duties or in the best interests ofthe other party, but may pursue only 
his or her own interests. Thus, Civil Law allows a right to excessiveness 
within the boundaries of section 138 and section 242 BGB and does not 
117 Martin Joseph Schermaier, Good Faith in European Contract Law 63, 66 (Rein-
hard Zimmermann and Sirnon Whittacker eds., 2000). 
118 Lorenz Kähler, Verhältnismäßigkeit, 210, 221 (Matthias Jestaedt and Oliver 
Lepsius eds., 20 15). 
119 Opposing Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, JZ 993, 1001 et seq. (1987); Claus-Wilhelm 
Canaris, JZ 494, 497 ( 1988); the following authors: Thilo Ramm, JZ 489, 491 et 
seq. (1988); Dieter Medicus, 192 AcP 35, 66 et seq. (1992); Ulrich Preis, Fest-
schrift for Dietrich, 429, 460 (1999); Gerald Spindler, BGB, section 823 recital 
0.12 (Heinz Georg Baroberger and Herbert Roth eds., 3'd ed. 2012); Dirk Loo-
schelders and Dirk Olzen, BGB, section 242 recital 278 (Julius von Staudinger 
ed., revised ed. 2015); Lorenz Kähler, Verhältnismäßigkeit, 210,215 (Matthias 
Jestaedt and Oliver Lepsius eds., 2015). 
120 Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. III/1, 1578 
(Klaus Stern ed. 1988); Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, recital355 (201h ed. 1999). 
121 Ulrich Preis, Festschrift for Dietrich, 429, 448 (1999). 
122 Marcus Bieder, Das ungeschriebene Verhältnismäßigkeilsprinzip als Schranke 
privater Rechtsausübung 39 et seqq. (2007). 
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perform a content review. In terms of a presumption rufe, a refutable pre-
sumption for the validity of privately autonomaus agreements applies. 123 
Tbe legislator introduced the proportionality test when General Terms 
and Conditions and their one-sided shaping power impair the other party's 
self-determination: Clauses according to section 307 para. I BGB, for in-
stance, are void if they "unreasonably disadvantage" the other party. 124 
Shaping powers, such as the termination of a contract, must be exercised 
proportionately. 125 Here, the prohibition ofthe legally abusive exercise of a 
law under section 242 BGB is in effect. 
The Constitutional Law, and thus also the proportionality control, must 
always be considered especially if the Constitutional Law directly ajfects 
the Civil Law. Decisions in the legal matters Lüth126 or Lebach127 illustrate 
that injunctive relief or darnage claims under Civil Law must be limited. 
The general right of privacy, for exarnple, must also be protected by the 
protection obligation of the State under Civil Law. However, this can be 
opposed by the freedom of opinion. Therefore, comprehensive balancing 
must be performed.128 The above-mentioned art vandal may, however, not 
claim that the liability for damages restricts his or her life planning in the 
long term ifhe or sbe caused the darnage on the basis ofself-determination. 
It would be absurd if the culprit who acted deliberately would not be held 
liable only because he or she caused particularly high damages.129 
123 Ulrich Preis, Festschrift for Dietrich, 429,440 (1999) and above III.3.b). 
124 Ulrich Preis, Festschrift for Dietrich, 429, 440 (1999). 
125 BOH, February 17, 1955, II ZR 316/53, BOHZ 16,3 17, 322 et seqq. on section 
140 HOB. Campare also section 133 para. 2 HOB. 
126 BVerfG, January 15, 1958, I BvR 400/51, BVerfGE 7, 198 - LUth. 
127 BVerfG, June 5, 1973, I BvR 536/72, BVerfGE 35, 202- Lebach. 
128 BOH, October 26, 1951 , I ZR 8/51, BOHZ 3, 270, 280 et seqq.- Constanze I; 
BOH, June 21 , 1966, VI ZR 261 /64, BOHZ 45, 296, 307 et seqq.- Hellfire; 
Oottfried Schiemann, HKK-BOB, sections 823, 830, 840, 842-853 recital 122 
(2013); Hartwig Sprau, BOB, section 823 recital 95 et seqq. (Otto Palandt ed., 
771h ed. 2018). 
129 Differing view Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, JZ 993, I 00 I et seq. ( 1987); Claus-WH-
helm Canaris, JZ 494, 497, fh . 108 (1988). 
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2. Principle ofproportionality in Chinese Civil Law? 
Tbe GRCL were not aware ofthe principle ofproportionality; it was, how-
ever, at least debated in Public Law130• Ultimately, the principle ofpropor-
tionality can only be transferred to Civil Law if the legislator establishes 
corresponding regulations as is the case in the dispositive Contract Law and 
the inspection of the General Terms and Conditions according to sec-
tians 309 et seqq. BGB. Apart from that, deducing a general principle of 
proportionality from section 6 GRCL must be handled with care. Instead, 
the freedom of contract must be properly determined. The obligations 
would have to be substantiated in detail through the Chinese Contract 
Law131 as explained above. 
VI. Summary 
1. The General Rules ofChinese Law (GRCL) of20 17 contain numerous 
legal principles of the General Part, as for instance legal transactions 
or the Law of Minors. Additionally, there are generallegal principles 
such as the freedom to contract or the protection of absolute legal as-
sets. Legal principles must be differentiated from the legal idea and the 
legal rule. Legal ideas such as justice, practicality, and legal security 
are highly abstract which renders them (useless) empty phrases in the 
resolution of cases. Legal rules or legal principles, however, can be 
subsumed. 
The Civil Code, which was influenced by the Pandectics of the 19th 
century132, trains the Germanjurist in systematic thinking, the legal 
dogmatics, and principles related thereto. For the development of 
130 Yuanshi Bu, Einfilhrung in das Recht Chinas, 45 (2008) with further references. 
131 See also Yuanshi Bu, Einfilhrung in das Recht Chinas, 102 et seqq. (2008). 
132 As for instance Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, System des Pandektenrechts, 
vol. 3, (5'h ed. 1846); Georg Friedrich Puchta, Pandekten (5'h ed. 1850); Bem-
hard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, vol. 3 (Ti' ed. 1891 ); Heinrich 
Demburg, Pandekten, vol. 3 (4th ed. 1894); Ferdinand Regelsberger, Pandekten, 
vol. 1 (1893); Reinhard Zimmermann, HKK-BGB, before section I recital 6 et 
seqq. (Matthias Schmoeckel et al. eds., 2003). 
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law133, but also for a better understanding, consolidated legal dogmat-
ics with legal principles are needed. 134 Legal principles are not only 
non-binding ideas. Legal principles create meaning by means oftheir 
interaction and allow for a certain degree of generalisation. Legal prin-
ciples generally claim normative validity and result in a presumption 
of confonnity. They cannot be subsumed and need tobe further sub-
stantiated. 
2. In a first step, legal principles must be derived from the current law. In 
a second step, the rules must be substantiated. The legal sentence Iex 
specialis derogat legi generali serves this purpose. 
3. Further necessary substantiation has to be perfonned by balancing or 
induction and deduction. The aim is to establish legal rules as regula-
tions with similar factual conditions. 
In Civil Law, the freedom to contract is an important legal principle 
which can be derived indirectly from several provisions of the BGB. 
Individual legal rules, as for example, the obligation to contract, the 
price control, or the doctrine offrustration of contracts seem to contra-
dict this principle. Neither an accuracy check, nor a social principle, 
nor the influence ofthe constitution are able to explain the obligation 
to contract, the price control, or the doctrine offrustration of contracts. 
These legal principles can ratherbe established by the principle ofself-
determination which is part ofthe private autonomy. 
4. Further substantiation is possible through the principle Iex superior 
derogat legi inferiori. This principle is for instance applicable to sev-
eral governmental authorities as with regard to central power and prov-
ince. It is, however, questionable, to what extent the basic rights ofthe 
constitution must be considered. 
5. The collision of principles can also be used to substantiate principles. 
Balancing, which the principle ofproportionality (section 6 GRCL) is 
based on, can be used for this purpose. However, balancing in German 
133 On the function of generallegal principles to fill gaps see above 1.1. 
134 Legal dogmatics is descriptively compared to gramrnar, without which the lan-
guage, here the legal provisions, cannot be understood, Maximilian Herberger, 
Dogmatik, 37 et seq., 74 et seqq., 119, 257 et seqq. (1981) with detailed refer-
ences on Roman law; Ni1s Jansen, ZEuP 750, 754 (2005). 
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law is a domain ofPublic Law. Examining the basic rights, the sophis-
ticated legal dogmatics, differentiates between scope of protection, in-
fringement, justification, and exceptions for restrictions ofbasic rights. 
Details are, however, disputed because ofthe allocation ofthe burden 
of argumentation and justification: Using the fundamental freedoms 
generally does not require justification but attempting to restriet them 
does. 
The principle of proportionality, however, is only restrictively appli-
cable in Civil Law. 
6. Ifthe work with legal principles is correctly understood, principles can 
be directly derived from the valuations ofthe legislation and the law. 
Applying the customs according to section 10 GRCL is therefore gen-
erally not necessary. 
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